Robust rankings of multi-dimensional performances: An application to Tour de France racing cyclists by Laurens Cherchye & Frederic Vermeulen
Robust rankings of
multi-dimensional performances
An application to Tour de France racing
cyclists￿
Laurens Cherchyeyand Frederic Vermeulenz
September 24, 2004
Abstract
There is a general interest in ranking performances (e.g., in sports
or policy), which essentially implies aggregating several performance
dimensions. The usual approach considers a ￿ cardinal￿linear weighting
of the di⁄erent single-dimensional performance indicators. We present
an alternative approach, which merely requires ￿ ordinal￿information
regarding the importance of the di⁄erent performance dimensions. We
argue that this approach is robust with respect to alternative speci￿ca-
tions of the (possibly non-linear) underlying performance aggregation
function. An application to Tour de France racing cyclists (in the pe-
riod 1953-2004) illustrates the approach. We ￿nd that Eddy Merckx,
Bernard Hinault and Lance Armstrong (robustly) dominate almost all
other racing cyclists in our sample, while they do not dominate each
other. A net-dominance metric ranks Bernard Hinault on the ￿rst
place in our sample; Eddy Merckx and Lance Armstrong follow very
closely ex-aequo on the second place.
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11 Introduction
There is a general interest in performance rankings. This is most apparent
in a sports context; see, e.g., the widespread use of football team rankings,
baseball team rankings, and so on. But the practice of performance rank-
ing actually covers a much wider ￿eld. For example, the Joint Research
Centre (2004) of the European Commission reports on cross-country policy
performance rankings in the ￿elds of environment, sustainability, economy,
technological development, etc. Another example is provided by the Hu-
man Development Index, which measures a country￿ s performance in basic
dimensions of human development, like life expectancy, education level and
standard of living (Fukada-Parr et al., 2004). Finally, there are the well-
known rankings of economists and economics departments, based on diverse
measures of journal output (e.g., CoupØ, 2003; Kalaitzidakis et al., 2003;
Lubrano et al., 2003).
Essentially, the production of performance rankings boils down to aggre-
gating several performance dimensions. The usual approach uses an aggre-
gation statistic that can be represented as a weighted sum of the indicators
associated with each single performance dimension. In general, using cij to
denote observation i￿ s (i = 1;:::;n; with n the total number of observations)
performance in terms of the j￿ th (j = 1;:::;k; with k the total number of
performance dimensions) positive-valued indicator, the aggregate index for







where wj is the weight associated with each single-dimensional indicator j.
For simplicity, we further assume that each performance dimension can be
considered as a ￿ good￿ , such that the associated weights wj are always posi-
tive.
The interpretation of the index in (1) is obvious: better performance in
a particular dimension generally implies a higher overall index value. More-
over, the higher the weight of that dimension, the higher the increase of the
index value. An advantage of such a weighted sum index is that it provides
a complete ranking: it allows for comparing any two observations i1;i2 2
f1;:::;ng in terms of their overall/aggregate performance. It is also clear,
however, that di⁄erent weighting schemes (even if they preserve the same or-
dering) will yield other index values; and, importantly, more often than not
the most appropriate weighting scheme is not readily available. In turn, this
makes that the concomitant (complete) ranking will not be generally robust.
In addition, the linear aggregation function implicitly assumes a constant
2trade-o⁄ between the di⁄erent performance dimensions, which may often be
problematic. For example, it is frequently the case that for an observation
i 2 f1;:::;ng the relative value/weight of dimension j1 as compared to j2
(j1;j2 2 f1;:::;kg) increases when cij1 decreases relative to cij2 (see, e.g.,
the common assumption of diminishing marginal rates of substitution in eco-
nomics). More generally, rankings on the basis of linear aggregation functions
are not robust with respect to often more realistic non-linear representations
of the implicit performance production trade-o⁄s.
We propose a methodology for obtaining performance rankings that are
robust both in terms of the weighting scheme that is employed and in terms
of the (possible non-linear) trade-o⁄s between the di⁄erent performance di-
mensions. Its philosophy is closely related to what is commonly referred to
as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA; see Cooper et al., 2000, for a method-
ological introduction). As argued, e.g., by Melyn and Moesen (1991), DEA
applies a ￿ bene￿t-of-the-doubt￿weighting, which essentially means that an
observation is outperformed by other observations only if there does not exist
a weighting scheme such that it obtains the best overall performance. This
obtains performance rankings that are robust with respect to the speci￿c
weighting scheme that is used: an observation is DEA-dominated if for each
possible weighting scheme (i.e., including the ￿ most favorable￿scheme) there
is another observation that obtains a higher aggregate index value. DEA
has recently been applied within a sports context (e.g., Lozano et al., 2002;
Haas et al., 2004; De Oliveira and Callum, 2004; Einolf, 2004) and within a
cross-country policy evaluation context (e.g., Cherchye, 2001; Evans et al.,
2003; Cherchye and Kuosmanen, 2004; Cherchye et al., 2004).
Even though it has an attractive weighting interpretation, the DEA ap-
proach still applies a linear (i.e., weighted sum) aggregation of the di⁄erent
performance dimensions. Our methodology drops this linearity (or constant
trade-o⁄) assumption. It merely uses information regarding the ordering of
the di⁄erent performance dimensions. Indeed, while it may often be di¢ cult
to specify how much one performance dimension is more important than an-
other dimension, it is usually fairly easy to determine simply that the ￿rst
dimension is more important than the second. Putting it di⁄erently, ￿ or-
dinal￿weighting information is often much easier to obtain than ￿ cardinal￿
weighting information. Although such an ordinal ranking may also be some-
what arbitrary, it is clearly more robust than associating cardinal weights to
the criteria; e.g., a given ordinal ranking encompasses all possible cardinal
rankings that are order preserving. Our methodology then obtains robust
performance rankings from such ordinal information by implementing an in-
tuitive ￿ compensation principle￿ . Speci￿cally, the method identi￿es for each
observation (i) the set of other observations that it outperforms and (ii) the
3set of observations that outperform it; these sets apply to any (possibly non-
linear) aggregation function that respects the aforementioned compensation
principle. Conveniently, given that the method is based on the intuitive com-
pensation principle, it is easy-to-communicate. In addition, as we will show,
the method is easy to implement computationally.
An application to Tour de France racing cyclists illustrates our method-
ology for ranking sports performances. Indeed, a yearly recurring question,
mostly somewhere in July, is which racing cyclist can be considered as the
best Tour de France participant ever. Answering this question is somewhat
tricky; the overall evaluation of the Tour de France performance is not obvi-
ous at all. For example, if we solely focus on the number of ￿nal victories,
then Lance Armstrong would outperform all others (including the ￿ve times
winners Jacques Anquetil, Eddy Merckx, Bernard Hinault and Miguel In-
durain) because of his sixth Yellow jersey (which indicates the leader in the
general time classi￿cation after the ￿nal stage in the Tour) in 2004. As soon
as other dimensions are taken into account, however, the question becomes
substantially more di¢ cult. For example, how do we deal with the fact that
Merckx and Hinault each won the Green jersey (which indicates the leader
in the points classi￿cation after the ￿nal stage) at least once, whereas Arm-
strong never managed to do so? And what about Merckx￿ s 34 individual day
victories as compared to Armstrong￿ s 21? Generally, answering the question
depends on which criteria are taken into account and on the weight that is
accorded to each of these criteria. Our robust approach turns out to be a
useful tool for addressing the issue.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. The next section intro-
duces the methodology, and argues its robust nature. Section 3 presents
the data and empirical results of our application to Tour de France racing
cyclists. Section 4 concludes.
2 Methodology
For simplicity, we assume in the following that the di⁄erent performance
indicators are ranked in descending order according to their importance.
That is, dimension 1 is at least as important as dimension 2, which is in
turn at least as important as dimension 3, and so on. As argued in the
introduction, this is the sole (ordinal) information that is used in our robust
ranking procedure. Our methodology builds on a compensation principle that
includes this information in the performance ranking. Using V to represent
the performance aggregation function that implicitly underlies the ordering
4(but that is not observed), we may de￿ne this principle as follows:1
De￿nition 1 An aggregation function V : <k ! < satis￿es the compensa-
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V (ci11;:::;ci1k) ￿ V (ci21;:::;ci2k):
In words, the compensation principle states that one unit more of a higher
ranked performance dimension may compensate for one unit less of a lower
ranked dimension, but not vice versa. Consequently, an observation i1 2
f1;:::;ng can only dominate another observation i2 2 f1;:::;ng if i1 performs
at least as good as i2 in terms of the highest ranked performance dimension
(i.e., ci1j ￿ ci21). Next, when regarding the second dimension, even if i1
does not perform as good as i2 in terms of this dimension, dominance of i1
can be obtained if a better performance in the more important dimension
1 compensates this worse performance in dimension 2. Formally, this means
that the sum of i1￿ s performance indicators 1 and 2 should not be below the
same sum for i2 (i.e., ci11 + ci12 ￿ ci21 + ci22). And so on. Intuitively, the
compensation principle directly exploits the (sole) ordinal information that is
available. It is worth noting that this intuition e⁄ectively applies only if the
di⁄erent performance indicators are expressed in a comparable measurement
unit. This is indeed the case in our application (as well as in many other
settings where similar ranking issues occur).
The compensation principle immediately institutes the following domi-












We say that observation i1 dominates i2 if Io
i1;i2 ￿ 0; it means that V (ci11;
:::; ci1k) ￿ V (ci21;:::;ci2k) for any possible performance aggregation function
that satis￿es the compensation principle. For some given speci￿cation of the
importance ordering, the metric is easily computed from the available data on
the single-dimensional performance indicators. By simply using the intuitive
and generally acceptable compensation principle, we obtain pairwise domi-
nance relationships that most directly let ￿ the data speak for themselves￿ .
1We note that this compensation principle is similar in spirit to the ￿ sequential dom-
inance￿idea in the literature on welfare comparisons (e.g., Atkinson and Bourguignon,
1987).
5Using the metric in (2), we can illustrate the robustness of our dominance-
based ranking procedure with respect to alternative speci￿cations of the ag-
gregation function V . Speci￿cally, it includes the following two limiting sce-
narios: (i) all weight is accorded to only a single performance dimension;
and (ii) all performance dimensions get the same weight. First, we have
that ci11 < ci21 implies Io
i1;i2 < 0. In other words, we can never specify that
i1 dominates i2 if the former observation is dominated by the latter in the
single most important performance dimension; this makes that the domi-
nance relationships obtained from the metric in (2) are always consistent








i1;i2 < 0; this immediately obtains consistency with the dom-
inance relationships corresponding to the extreme scenario (ii). Clearly, the
same robustness argument extends to all intermediary (possibly non-linear)
speci￿cations of V .
To illustrate our procedure, we consider the ￿ctitious example in Table
1, which includes data on the number of Yellow jerseys and Green jerseys for
four (imaginary) Tour de France racing cyclists. Suppose now that we attach
a greater weight to the Yellow jersey than to the Green jersey (while we do not
specify the exact trade-o⁄ value). Clearly, racing cyclist A dominates both
racing cyclists B and C: he performs at least as good with respect to both
criteria. However, although D gained the Green jersey four times, compared
to two times for A, the latter racing cyclist also dominates the former, since
his three Yellow jerseys compensate for three Green jerseys of racing cyclist
D. In the same way, it is easily checked that also B dominates C. However,
neither of these latter two racing cyclists dominates racing cyclist D; B and
C do not have enough Yellow jerseys to compensate for the additional Green
jerseys of D. Table 2 summarizes who (see column title) is dominating who
(see row title) in this example.
So far, we have focused on pairwise dominance relationships, which im-
ply a ranking for any combination of two observations. In some instances,
it may be interesting to construct a full ranking of all observations in the
sample, starting from this pairwise dominance information. We see di⁄erent
possibilities. One natural candidate is the di⁄erence between (i) the number
of other observations that a given observation dominates and (ii) the num-
ber of other observations that dominate this evaluated observation; higher
values of this ￿ net-dominance￿metric then correspond to a higher ranking
within the full sample. In our ￿ctitious example, this procedure would rank
cyclist A on the ￿rst place, followed by -maybe somewhat unexpectedly- the
cyclists B and D and, ￿nally, cyclist C. Evidently, other ranking procedures
6are equally possible. For example, one may focus exclusively on the number
of observations that is e⁄ectively dominated or, conversely, the number of
observations that is dominating each individual observation. While our fol-
lowing application will mainly concentrate on the net-dominance metric (for
the sake of compactness), we stress that it may be insightful to simultane-
ously consider alternative ranking procedures in practice; each ranking will
yield information that is interesting on its own.
[Table 1 about here]
[Table 2 about here]
3 Application to Tour de France racing cy-
clists
We apply the just described methodology to a sample of modern Tour de
France participants, hereby focusing on the following six single performance
indicators: the number of Yellow jerseys (allocated to the leader in the gen-
eral time classi￿cation after the ￿nal stage in the Tour), the number of second
places in the general time classi￿cation (after the ￿nal stage), the number of
third places in the general time classi￿cation (after the ￿nal stage), the num-
ber of Green jerseys (leader in the general points classi￿cation after the ￿nal
stage), the number of Red Polka Dot jerseys (leader in the best climber clas-
si￿cation after the ￿nal stage) and the number of individual day victories.2
In order to determine the ordinal ranking that is needed for the exercise,
we consulted sports journalists of the Flemish public broadcasting service.
This eventually obtained the following ranking: (1) Yellow jersey, (2) second
place, (3) third place, (4) day victory, (5) Green jersey and (6) Red Polka Dot
jersey.3 The ranking criterion that we focus on is the net-dominance metric
introduced in the previous section (i.e., the di⁄erence between the number of
dominated cyclists and the number of cyclists by whom one is dominated).
Our sample includes all racing cyclists who were able to ￿ score￿on one of
the above six dimensions in at least one of their participations to the Tour
2Note that after each stage in the Tour de France, each of the three jerseys are handed
out to the respective leaders in the di⁄erent classi￿cations. We only focus on the ￿nal
winners of the classi￿cations (e.g., the number of Yellow jerseys is here the number of
times a racing cyclist was able to win the general time classi￿cation after the last stage).
Next, day victories in team trials are not taken into account.
3Di⁄erent journalists gave slightly di⁄erent ordinal rankings. We have chosen the rank-
ing that most closely resembles the journalists￿answers. Of course, the exercise can easily
be replicated for alternative rankings. Interested readers may contact us to get results for
their personal ranking.
7de France. Since the Green jersey was only introduced in 1953, we restrict
attention to racing cyclists participating to the Tour between 1953 and 2004
(both included).4 As a consequence, our following analysis excludes excel-
lent racing cyclists like Philippe Thys (who obtained three ￿nal victories) or
Fausto Coppi and Gino Bartali (who are generally considered as belonging
to the circle of best racing cyclists ever). However, it should be stressed that
all racing cyclists who won the Tour ￿ve or more times are included in the
analysis.
The full sample contains 499 racing cyclists; all data were obtained from
L￿ Equipe (2002) and SociØtØ du Tour de France (2004). Table 3 presents
summarizing frequency information for the six indicators. We ￿nd that only
one racing cyclist was able to win the Tour de France six times (namely Lance
Armstrong); and four other racing cyclists managed to win the Yellow jersey
￿ve times (namely Jacques Anquetil, Eddy Merckx, Bernard Hinault and
Miguel Indurain). We obtain closely similar frequency distributions for the
second and third places, and the Green and Red Polka Dot jerseys. Record
holders with respect to these criteria are respectively Joop Zoetemelk (six
second places), Raymond Poulidor (￿ve third places), Erik Zabel (six Green
jerseys) and Richard Virenque (seven Red Polka Dot jerseys). Evidently,
the frequency table for the individual day victories looks somewhat di⁄erent.
Most of the racing cyclists in the dataset at least won one stage in the Tour
(only 17 individuals have no single day victory). The record holder is Eddy
Merckx with 34 victories, followed by Bernard Hinault (28 victories) and
AndrØ Darrigade (22 victories). As these simple key ￿gures suggest, racing
cyclists like Merckx and Hinault perform well on several criteria. However, no
participant outperforms the other racing cyclists in every single dimension,
which makes aggregating the di⁄erent performance dimensions an interesting
question.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4 presents a selection of dominance relationships for our dataset.
For compactness, we only tabulate a fraction of the full (499￿499) dominance
matrix.5 Speci￿cally, the columns of Table 4 correspond to all the racing
cyclists who won the Tour de France at least three times. The rows then
4In 1975, the White jersey was introduced for the best young rider in the Tour de
France. It replaced the award for the winner of the so-called Combination classi￿cation
(combining three or four classi￿cations in the Tour de France). Since the rules with respect
to these criteria frequently changed in the history of the Tour de France, we only focus on
the aforementioned six criteria.
5The full dominance matrix can be obtained from the authors at simple request. This
also applies to the results in Table 5.
8contain the cyclists who won the Yellow jersey at least one time, and the
record holders for the other performance dimensions (we note that some
Yellow jersey winners also obtain the highest values for second places and
day victories).
Just like in the ￿ctitious example above, entries in the table show the
(row) racing cyclists that a particular (column) racing cyclist dominates. To
illustrate the interpretation of this dominance table, we discuss a number of
interesting patterns that emerge. First, when looking at the racing cyclists
who won the Tour de France at least ￿ve times, we ￿nd that Armstrong,
Hinault and Merckx are only dominated by themselves. Even though Arm-
strong is the record holder for the number of Yellow jerseys, the fact that
he has one more ￿nal victory than Hinault and Merckx cannot compensate
for the other criteria on which the latter two cyclists scored better (notably:
second places, day victories and Green and Red Polka Dot jerseys; see Table
5). On the other hand, we observe that Anquetil is dominated by all four
racing cyclists who were just cited (including himself). Although Anquetil
obtained a strictly higher number of third places than Armstrong, Hinault
and Merckx (see Table 5), the latter three dominate the former at the overall
level since they performed strictly better on other, more important criteria;
their performance in terms of these more important dimensions thus com-
pensates for their worse performance in terms of the total number of third
places.
Next, it is worth considering the last three rows in the table, which con-
tain the record holders for the number of third places (Raymond Poulidor),
Green (Erik Zabel) and Red Polka Dot jerseys (Richard Virenque). Quite
strikingly, no racing cyclist (except from himself) dominates Poulidor. The
reason is that Poulidor obtained no less than three second places and ￿ve
third places. No other cyclist can compensate this by higher scores in terms
of the other dimensions that are at least as important. For example, although
Armstrong￿ s higher ranked six ￿nal victories compensate for Poulidor￿ s three
second places and for three of the ￿ve third places, they cannot compen-
sate for Poulidor￿ s remaining third places. Since the number of third places
is more important than the number of day victories, it is not possible to
compare Armstrong￿ s 21 victories to Poulidor￿ s performance that is not yet
compensated for (notably two remaining third places and seven individual
day victories). As for this speci￿c case, it is important to stress that this does
not mean that Poulidor himself dominates cyclists like Armstrong, Merckx
and Hinault; none of the items where Poulidor outperforms these three can
compensate their dominance in terms of the most important criterion.6 Fi-
6More generally, the fact that ￿ observation a does not dominate observation b￿should
9nally, the table shows that Richard Virenque and Erik Zabel are dominated
by most of the column racing cyclists, but not by all of them. Virenque, for
example, is not dominated by Greg LeMond and Louison Bobet, who each
won three Yellow jerseys. Erik Zabel (six Green jerseys and 12 day victories)
is even not dominated by Miguel Indurain, who won the Tour ￿ve times.
[Table 4 about here]
Table 5 provides a ranking of modern Tour de France racing cyclists based
on the net-dominance metric (computed with respect to the full sample of
499 cyclists). For completeness, we also report the number of cyclists that
each evaluated racing cyclist dominates (see the column ￿ Dominating￿ ) and
the number of racing cyclists by whom the evaluated individual is dominated
(see the column ￿ Dominated￿ ). To save space, we restrict to tabulating the
￿rst 30 racing cyclists in the full ranking. The net-dominance metric indi-
cates Bernard Hinault as the best modern Tour de France participant: he
dominates 496 (of the 499) racing cyclists, while he is only dominated by
himself. Hinault is closely followed by Lance Armstrong and Eddy Merckx,
who end ex-aequo on the second place of the ranking: they both dominate
495 participants and are only dominated by themselves. (Remark that an
equal ranking here does not mean that Armstrong and Merckx dominate
each other.) The results also indicate that one does not need many ￿nal
Tour victories in order to be highly ranked. The case of Joop Zoetemelk,
who won the Yellow jersey only once, is exemplary in this respect: thanks
to six second places and ten day victories, he dominates 485 racing cyclists,
while he is dominated by only two participants (i.e., Bernard Hinault and
himself). Erik Zabel closes the list of the 30 most highly ranked Tour de
France racing cyclists: although he never stood on the main podium in Paris,
his six Green jerseys and twelve day victories make him e⁄ectively dominate
421 participants, which is much above the number of seven racing cyclists
who dominate him.
[Table 5 about here]
not imply that ￿ observation b dominates observation a￿ . In this respect, it is worth recalling
that we present a procedure for performance ranking that is robust with respect to the
(cardinal) speci￿cation of the performance aggregation function. Speci￿cally, we only
retain dominance relationships that hold for all possible aggregation functions that obey
the compensation principle in De￿nition 1.
104 Conclusion
We have presented a methodology for robust ranking of multi-dimensional
performances. It builds on an intuitive compensating principle, which essen-
tially states that better performance in more important performance dimen-
sions can compensate for worse performance in less important dimensions,
but not vice versa. Using this, the method only needs ordinal information re-
garding the importance of the di⁄erent performance dimensions, so avoiding
the often di¢ cult and controversial (cardinal) speci￿cation of a performance
aggregation function. As such, it lets ￿ the data speak for themselves￿in a most
genuine sense. This obtains pairwise dominance relationships that are robust
to any possible speci￿cation of the aggregation function that preserves the
speci￿ed dimensional ordering. Interestingly, the underlying compensation
principle is easy-to-communicate and the dominance relationships are easy-
to-compute, which makes the presented approach attractive from a practical
point of view.
The pairwise dominance information can be used for obtaining a full rank-
ing of the di⁄erent observations in the sample under study; for example, we
have suggested a net-dominance metric as a useful tool for such a purpose.
Still, it is worth to stress at this point that the pairwise relationships as
such may already provide useful information; e.g., in an interactive setting,
dominating observations may constitute useful benchmarks for dominated
performance units that pursue to improve their own performance. Finally,
while we have applied the method to ranking sports performances, we be-
lieve that it may also be a valuable instrument in other contexts (e.g., policy
benchmarking in a cross-country policy assessment or an evaluation of eco-
nomics departments; see the applications referred to in the introduction).
Our application to Tour de France racing cyclists demonstrates the prac-
tical usefulness of this robust ranking approach. For example, it shows how
the pairwise dominance relationships can be useful for discriminating between
the ￿ve times Yellow jersey winners (e.g., Eddy Merckx and Bernard Hin-
ault versus Jacques Anquetil and Miguel Indurain). Also, it enables robust
positioning of the six time winner Lance Armstrong vis-￿-vis these di⁄er-
ent ￿ve times champions; and it allows for comparing multi-winners in the
di⁄erent dimensions that we consider (Yellow Jerseys, second places, third
places, day victories, Green jerseys and Red Polka Dot jerseys). Finally, our
net-dominance metric obtains a full ranking of the modern Tour de France
participants. It turns out that Bernard Hinault comes at the ￿rst place, very
closely followed by (ex-aequo) Eddy Merckx and Lance Armstrong; these
three racers (robustly) dominate almost all other cyclists (a notable excep-
11tion is Raymond Poulidor, who is dominated by no other cyclist).7
One possible criticism regarding our analysis is that it may be problem-
atic to compare the performance of Tour de France racing cyclists in di⁄er-
ent eras. Indeed, cycling races have become increasingly internationalized.
In addition, especially since the beginning of the nineties, racing cyclists
have more and more become specialists in a single aspect of cycling, while
in earlier times racing cyclists like Anquetil, Merckx and Hinault used to be
outstanding not only in the Tour de France but also in many other important
races. (Remark that this tendency to specialize actually also applies to the
Tour itself; e.g., we have nowadays specialists that focus on the ￿nal victory
versus others that exclusively pursue the Green or the Red Polka Dot jersey.)
In our application, we have chosen to put together racing cyclists of di⁄erent
eras in one and the same sample; in our opinion, this allows for most directly
answering the question ￿ Who is the best Tour de France participant (since
1953)?￿ . Moreover, only seven racing cyclists who have been active in the
last ten years are recorded in our list of the thirty highest ranked partici-
pants. Taking into account the importance of the Tour de France nowadays
and the present-day￿ s specialization, this seems to indicate that racing cy-
clists of earlier eras are not put at a disadvantage in our exercise. But if
one still believes that di⁄erent eras are intrinsically non-comparable, then
one may conduct additional exercises that focus on subsamples (and that
include, e.g., only the racing cyclists who were able to score on at least one
of the six dimensions in the last ten years). This essentially boils down to
de￿ning alternative (net-dominance) metrics (leading up to a potentially dif-
ferent overall ranking) from the matrix containing the pairwise dominance
relationships (compare with the net-dominance metric results in Table 5 that
basically summarize the pairwise dominance information in Table 4); and, in
e⁄ect, it does not require additional computations regarding these pairwise
dominance relationships.
7As a ￿nal quali￿cation, we point out that these results are, of course, conditional upon
the ordinal ranking of the di⁄erent performance dimensions that is speci￿ed prior to the
analysis. Some may argue that a di⁄erent dimensional ordering is more appropriate. In
such a case, sensitivity analysis is in order; the easy-to-compute nature of the proposed
method makes such a sensivity check easy to implement in practice. As for our own
application, we obtain that our results (e.g., the identity of the top-three that dominates
almost the entire pack of other racing cycists) are fairly robust with respect to alternative
orderings that may be considered as ￿ reasonable￿ . For compactness, we did not include
these results here, but they are available from the authors at simple request.
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Table 1: A ￿ctitious dataset
A B C D
A 1 0 0 0
B 1 1 0 0
C 1 1 1 0
D 1 0 0 1
Table 2: A ￿ctitious dominance matrix
Note: Entry equal to 1 (0) implies that the racing cyclist in the associated
row is (not) dominated by the racing cyclist in the associated column.
Yellow jersey Second place Third place Day victory Green Red Polka Dot
0 474 462 458 17 468 471
1 16 30 34 280 20 18
2 2 4 5 79 5 6
3 2 1 1 38 4 1
4 0 0 0 24 1 0
5 4 1 1 14 0 0
6 1 1 0 10 1 2
7 0 0 0 12 0 1
8 0 0 0 4 0 0
9 0 0 0 7 0 0
10 0 0 0 5 0 0
12 0 0 0 3 0 0
15 0 0 0 1 0 0
16 0 0 0 1 0 0
21 0 0 0 1 0 0
22 0 0 0 1 0 0
28 0 0 0 1 0 0
34 0 0 0 1 0 0
Table 3: Frequency table
15Armstrong Hinault Merckx Anquetil Indurain LeMond Bobet
Armstrong, Lance 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hinault, Bernard 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Merckx, Eddy 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Anquetil, Jacques 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Indurain, Miguel 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
LeMond, Greg 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Bobet, Louison 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fignon, Laurent 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
ThØvenet, Bernard 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Zoetemelk, Joop 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Ullrich, Jan 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Van Impe, Lucien 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
BahamontŁs, Federico 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Delgado, Pedro 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Janssen, Jan 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Gimondi, Felice 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pingeon, Roger 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Gaul, Charly 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Pantani, Marco 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Riis, Bjarne 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Roche, Stephen 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ocana, Luis 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nencini, Gastone 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Aimar, Lucien 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Walkowiak, Roger 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Poulidor, Raymond 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Virenque, Richard 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Zabel, Erik 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Table 4: Dominance matrix
Note: Entry equal to 1 (0) implies that the racing cyclist in the associated
row is (not) dominated by the racing cyclist in the associated column.
16Nr. Racing cyclist Yellow Second Third Red Polka Dot Green Day Dominating Dominated Net dominating
1 Hinault, Bernard 5 2 0 1 1 28 496 1 495
2 Armstrong, Lance 6 0 0 0 0 21 495 1 494
Merckx, Eddy 5 1 0 2 3 34 495 1 494
4 Anquetil, Jacques 5 0 1 0 0 16 492 4 488
5 Zoetemelk, Joop 1 6 0 0 0 10 485 2 483
Indurain, Miguel 5 0 0 0 0 12 488 5 483
7 Van Impe, Lucien 1 1 3 6 0 9 484 5 479
8 Ullrich, Jan 1 5 0 0 0 7 481 5 476
9 ThØvenet, Bernard 2 1 0 0 0 9 482 7 475
Fignon, Laurent 2 1 0 0 0 9 482 7 475
11 LeMond, Greg 3 1 1 0 0 5 477 6 471
12 Poulidor, Raymond 0 3 5 0 0 7 470 1 469
BahamontŁs, Federico 1 1 1 6 0 7 477 8 469
Bobet, Louison 3 0 0 0 0 7 476 7 469
15 Gaul, Charly 1 0 2 2 0 10 474 8 466
16 Janssen, Jan 1 1 0 0 3 7 471 11 460
17 Pantani, Marco 1 0 2 0 0 8 471 12 459
18 Gimondi, Felice 1 1 0 0 0 7 468 15 453
19 Virenque, Richard 0 1 1 7 0 7 460 9 451
20 Ocana, Luis 1 0 0 0 0 9 463 16 447
Delgado, Pedro 1 1 1 0 0 4 461 14 447
22 Pingeon, Roger 1 1 0 0 0 4 451 17 434
23 Chiappucci, Claudio 0 2 1 2 0 3 448 15 433
24 Riis, Bjarne 1 0 1 0 0 4 448 20 428
25 Van Springel, Herman 0 1 0 0 1 5 444 22 422
26 Jimenez, Julio 0 1 0 3 0 5 442 21 421
27 Bugno, Gianni 0 1 1 0 0 4 443 24 419
Darrigade, AndrØ 0 0 0 0 2 22 423 4 419
29 Maertens, Freddy 0 0 0 0 3 15 422 6 416
30 Zabel, Erik 0 0 0 0 6 12 421 7 414
Table 5: A ranking of modern Tour de France racing cyclists
17